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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTAH COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

No. 14233

EGBERT-HADERLIE HOG FARMS, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANTS BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for livestock loss and property
damage sustained by defendant which defendant alleges was caused
by plaintiff's sale to it of salmonella contaminated livestock
feed.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to a jury upon defendant's
Counterclaim and trial proceeded upon the theories of express
and implied warranty.

Defendant appeals to this Court from the

verdict directed against it upon its Counterclaim.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the directed verdict

"j

entered against it and a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties will be identified as they were at trial.
The appellant, Egbert-Haderlie Hog Farms, Inc., will be identifiec
throughout as defendant and the respondent, Utah Cooperative
Association, will be identified throughout as plaintiff,
i The facts at issue in this action focus upon the
condition of hog feed processed and sold by plaintiff to defendant
during June, 1973.
Defendant is a close corporation hog farm located in
the proximate vicinity of Spanish Fork, Utah.

During 1973, sole

ownership and management of the farm was vested in Paul F.
Haderlie, Howard B. Egbert, and his wife, Rita Egbert.

The hog

farm is income producing and directed solely toward the breeding
and marketing of the registered, purebred Duroc pig as both
breeding stock and fattened hogs (Tr. at 6, 77). During 1973,
the herd size averaged 280 - 300 head in size, of which 45 were
sows (Tr. at 4).

Defendant maintains a continuous, year around

farrowing program which it conducts within a modern hog house
building divided into a farrowing unit and nursery unit (Tr. at
7 - 1 0 ; defendant's exhibits 1 - 1 1 ) .

The physical plant,

facilities and housekeeping procedures of the defendant medically
qualify the operation as one bordering upon a specific, pathogenfree hog farm (Tr. at 192).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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by defendant in one of four weather tight two ton capacity
storage bins

(Tr. at 18).

Defendant's rate of feed consumption

averaged somewhat in excess of two tons~of feed for each two
weeks

(Tr. at 18).
Whenever changes were made to any of the three feed

formulaej

defendant met with the Orem feed mill employees and

there solicited their opinion of the formulae's suitability and/tt
price at which the feed could be accordingly processed. (Tr. at
16, 77). Throughout all transactions between plaintiff and
defendant there was an agreement that the grains supplied by
plaintiff were of good quality and that the processed hog feed
was of similar good quality

(Tr. at 77).

A written mixing order was prepared by plaintiff's
Orem feed mill personnel in response to each order for hog feed
made by defendant

(Tr.. at 16, 77). The ingredients and blending

proportions written on each mixing order were made to always confc
to the hog feed formulaes submitted by defendant

(Tr. at 16, 77;

plaintiff's exhibit 59).
On June 25, 1973 defendant placed with the Orem feed mil
an order for five tons of hog feed, which order included one ton
of the 16% lactation ration

(Tr. at 2 1 - 2 2 ; plaintiff's exhibits

59, 60). The hog feed formulae

governing this order were the

same as had been followed by the feed mill during the preceding
three to four months

(Tr. at 22). As done since 1971, defendant

delivered to the mill the required number of 50 pound sacks of
Mr. Meaty Mix

(Tr. at 21). Written mixing orders were accordingl:

prepared by the feed mill conforming to the directives of the
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
submittedDigitized
feed
formulae
. (Tr. at 21; plaintiff's exhibit 60).
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Orem feed mill made delivery of the five ton bulk load to
defendant's farm on June 27, 1975 and placed the bulk load into
defendant's storage bins

(Tr. at 22). -Paul Haderlie visually

examined the hog feed upon its delivery to the farm and while the
load was still in plaintiff's bulk delivery trucks

(Tr. at 84).

Defendant began feeding from this bulk load on either the 27th
or 28th day of June, 1973

(Tr. at 23). On June 29, 1973

Paul Haderlie observed that the weaner and feeder hogs in the
nursery (20 pounds to 60 pounds) were "rooting" the 16% lactation
ration pellets out of the self-feeders, and onto the floor
(Tr. at 23).

Believing the cause to be some contamination in the

self-feeders, the hopper units on the feeders were emptied of feed,
cleaned, and refilled with more 16% lactation ration

(Tr. at 23).

Haderlie checked these same hogs the next day and once again
observed that the feed was being rooted out of the self-feeders
rather than being eaten

(Tr. at 23). Egbert and Haderlie advised

the manager of plaintiff's Orem. mill on June 29, 1973 that something was wrong with the feed delivered.

The feed was inspected

July 2, 1973 directly from defendant's storage bins by the field
representative from the Orem mill together with Iladerlie

(Tr. at

49) . Haderlie accordingly advised this employee that the hor* feed
pellets were of a dark, off-color appearance and emitted an odor
rather than the fresh smell customarily emitted from the grains
composing this pellet feed

(Tr. at 41).

The agreement from this

July 2, 1973 meeting was that the involved five tons of pellet hog
feed would be picked up and replaced by the Orem. feed mill
(Tr. at 43).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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By July 3, 1973 approximately 207o of defendant's hog •-.»
herd had developed scours (diarrhea)

(Tr. at 46).

On this same

day Haderlie ordered from Leland Milling Company, Spanish Fork,
Utah, two tons of hog feed in 100 pound bags as partial replacemei
for the five ton delivery from plaintiff, which load continued
to remain in defendant's feed bins

(Tr. at 45, 64). An

additional two tons of replacement feed was ordered and delivered
from Leland Mills on July 7, 1973

(Tr. at 45, 64). This latter

order was delivered in bulk to defendant's farm.

Defendant create

storage space for this delivery by emptying from one bin the
approximate 1,300 pounds of 16% lactation feed remaining from the
plaintiff's initial two ton delivery of this ration

(Tr. at 44,

118 - 119). The feed processed by plaintiff was sold by it to a
third party and removed from defendant's farm by this person on
the afternoon of July 7, 1973

(Tr. at 45). This person reported

no adverse consequences from feeding this feed to his hogs.
The hog feed ordered from Leland Milling Company was
processed under the same feed formula as the hog feed processed b}
plaintiff's Orem feed mill

(Tr. at 119). Fifty pound bags of

Mr. Meaty Mix were similarly supplied by defendant to Leland
Milling Company as had been done with the Orem mill

(Tr, at 119).

The Mr. Meaty Mix bags delivered to Leland Milling Company bore
the same lot number identification as those delivered to the Orem
feed mill on June 25, 1973

(Tr. at 201). The hog feed processed

by Leland Milling Company was accepted and consumed by defendant's
hogs

(Tr. at 203).
On July 6, 1973 the outbreak of scours in defendant's

hogs wasDigitized
examined
initially
treated
by BYU.
Dr. Jon F. Hunter,
by the Howardand
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law School,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a Spanish Fork veterinarian

(Tr. at 155). Hunter himself confirmed

the off-color appearance of the hog feed processed by plaintiff and
the hog1s rejection of it

(Tr. at 155 - 156). The hogs were

placed on a broad spectrum medication to treat Hunter's preliminary diagnosis of severe diarrhea

(Tr. at 156). Feed samples and

fecal samples were taken by Dr. Hunter on his initial July 6, 1973
visit

(Tr. at 157). Two feed samples were taken by Hunter from

each of defendant's three hog feed rations then present in the
steel storage bins

(Tr. at 94 - 95, 158). Each feed sample was

taken in plastic, sterile whirl pack bags and each fecal sample
was taken with a sterile swab stick and placed within a sterile
transport media

(Tr. at 157). The fecal samples and one set of

feed samples taken on July 6, 1973 were mailed by Dr. Hunter to
the U. S. Department of Agriculture Research Laboratory
161).

(Tr. at

These laboratory tests reported no salmonella detected

in any of the feed samples and the presence of salmonella
enteriditis in all fecal samples

(Tr. at 161). The results were

utilized by Hunter to conclude that the scours in the hogs were
caused by the salmonella pathogen.
was changed accordingly

Hunter's medication schedule

(Tr. at 162, 179). Within this same

span of time, feed samples were similarly sent by defendant to
the Office of the State Chemist, Utah State Department of
Agriculture and to Omaha Testing Laboratories, Inc., Omaha,
Nebraska

(Tr. at 90, 121; plaintiff's exhibit 85). The Office

of the State Chemist detected no salmonella in the feed samples
tested by it

(plaintiff's exhibit 85). The Omaha, Nebraska

laboratory reported salmonella present in the 16% lactation ration
sample and no
salmonella present in the remaining two grain
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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samples

(Tr. at 121). Unlike the grain sample taken by Dr.

Hunter, the grain samples sent to Omaha, Nebraska were taken
by Paul Haderlie and mailed by him alone.

These samples were

taken from burlap bags which had been stored for some two weeks
in Egbert's Provo, Utah garage subsequent to being filled from
the feed storage bins by Haderlie on July 6, 1973

(Tr. at 91 - 91

On August 14, 1973 Hunter mailed the second set of grain samples
taken by him on July 6, 1973, together with recently taken fecal
samples to Intermountain Laboratories, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah
(Tr. at 162 - 163). The testing results of Intermountain
Laboratories, Inc., identified salmonella enteriditis (group E) ir
six of the seven submitted pig fecal samples

(defendant's

exhibits 62 - 65; Tr. at 134 - 137). Of the three feed samples
submitted, the laboratory reported abundant enterococci group D
strep present in the fattening ration sample, and moderate
salmonella (group E) together with a few enterococci group D strej
present in the 1670 lactation ration sample

(Tr. at 136 - 137).

Normal flora was reported for the gestation ration sample.

With

the results from Intermountain Laboratories, Inc., Hunter'once
again changed his medication schedule

(Tr. at 179). From

July 6, 1973, and into the first week of August, 42 of defendant's
hogs, ranging in size from 20 pounds to 60 pounds, died from
scours

(Tr. at 58). The scours in defendant's hogs was brought

largely under control by the first week of August but continued
to be present into September, 1973

(Tr. at 46, 62). The presence

of scours in defendant's hogs required defendant to hold 175 hogs
45 days beyond the time in which these hogs would have been
customarily marketed.

The presence of scours disrupted the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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weight gain regimen of defendant's feeding program so that these
hogs had not achieved their 200 pound marketing size within the
customary 5 1/2 month fattening period _(Tr. at 49 - 54).
On September 5, 1973, defendant evacuated the farrowing and
nursery hog house upon the medical recommendation of Dr. Hunter
so that the building and equipment could be chemically disinfected
and steam cleaned

(Tr. at 169). Eight sows with their litters

were moved outside.

The absence of outside farrowing facilities

of the type within the farrowing house resulted in the death of
24 suckling pigs

(Tr. at 62 - 63, 105).
ARGUMENT

Defendant's arguments in this brief are confined to the .
law governing a trial court in ruling upon a party's motion for
directed verdict under URCP 50(a)(as amended 1965).

The

controlling principle is that the court must examine the evidence
in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion
is made and must resolve every controverted fact in its favor.,
Vernon v. Lake Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269, 488 P2d 302 (1971).

In

ruling upon a directed verdict, the court is vested with no
discretion to weigh or determine the preponderance of the evidence.,
Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 P2d 491 (1952).
Defendant urges that the elements of the strict
liability warranty action measured against the evidence within
its case in chief preclude the award of a directed verdict against
it upon its Counterclaim.
The following statements are directed to the elements
of the strict liability breach of warranty action.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

These

statements are organized
at this
point
in the brief to facilitate
Machine-generated
OCR, may
contain errors.

organization and to avoid repetition.
A breach of warranty action commenced under the Utah
Uniform Commercial Code is premised upon strict liability.

I

This

form of liability focuses solely upon the condition of the product
and makes immaterial the quality of care utilized by the
supplier in the design, manufacture and disbribution of the
product.

White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 271-2 (1972).

E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Jordan,
254 So2d 17 (Fla App 1971)(10 UCC Rep 982). The converse of this
statement is that concepts of fault and negligence as defined by
negligence standards have no place in warranty cases.
2 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability. §16.01 (1)(1974).
The defendant's burden in this warranty action is to

-i

establish:
1.

The existence of a warranty; and

2.

That the warranty was breached by the defective or

t

nonconforming condition of the product; and
3.

That the defendant suffered loss as a proximate

result of the breach., see, Official Comment 13 to UCC §2-314.
Proof that the warranty was breached requires defendant
to affirmatively establish that the product was in a defective
condition at the time it left plaintiff's possession and control.
Hagenbuck v. Snap-On Tools Corp.,
339 FSupp 676, 10 UCC Rep 1005 (NH 1972); Lucchesi v. H. C. Bohack
Co., Inc., 8 UCC Rep 326 (NY Sup Ct 1970).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the question of the
existence of a warranty, whether it was breached, and whether the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
breach was
the proximate
cause of the alleged losses are issues
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of fact for jury determination.
Pacific Marine Schwabacher, Inc. v. Hydroswift,
525 P2d 615, 15 UCC Rep 354 (Utah 1974):

This holding by the

Utah Supreme Court delineating the function between the Court and
jury in a warranty action applies the majority rule, see,
McCarthy v. Florida Ladder Co.,
295 So2d 707 (Fla App 1974) 15 UCC Rep 375; Guardian Insurance
Co. v. Anacostia, 320 A2d 315, 14 UCC Rep 1125 (DC App 1974);
Judd Construction Co. v. Bob Post, Inc.,
516 P2d 449, 13 UCC Rep 800 (Colo App 1973); Paglia v. Chrysler
Corp., 327 NYS2d 978, 10 UCC Rep 304 (1972); Sinka v. Northern
Commercial Co., 491 P2d 116, 9 UCC Rep 1350 (Alaska 1971);
Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom,
382 F2d 395, 4 UCC Rep 681 (10th Cir 1967).
The exclusive use of circumstantial evidence to establish
both breach of warranty and that the breach was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's losses has been expressly approved by the
Utah Supreme Court.

Vernon v. Lake Motors,

26 Utah 279, 488 P2d 302, 9 UCC Rep 777 (1971); accord,
Paglia v. Chrysler Corp., 327 NYS2d 978, 10 UCC Rep 304 (1972);
Colorado Serum Co. v. Arp, 504 P2d 801, 11 UCC Rep 1152 (Wyo 1972);
General Supply & Equipment Co. v. Phillips,
490 SW2d 913, 12 UCC Rep 35 (Tex Civ App 1972);
Guardian Insurance Co v. Anacostia Chrysler,
320 A2d 315, 14 UCC Rep 1125 (DC App 1974); McCarthy v. Florida
Ladder Co., 295 So2d 707, 15 UCC Rep 375 (Fla App 1974).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The use of circumstantial evidence to establish a bread
of warranty proximately causing loss does not require that the

j

plaintiff exclude every other possible cause.
McMiller Feeds, Inc. v. Dale Harlow,
405 SW2d 123 (Tex Civ App 1966).

Circumstantial evidence is

sufficient to show a product causally defective if the probative
facts allow the jury to logically and reasonably conclude that
the greater probability of truth lies with the conclusion
sought by plaintiff.

Vernon v. Lake Motors,

26 Utah2d 269, 488 P2d 302, 9 UCC Rep 777 (1971).
The standard against which the quality of circumstantial
evidence is measured in a breach of warranty case is defined in'
Holokwa v. York Farm Bureau,
81 York LR 118, CCH Prod Liab Rptr Par 5855 (Penn 1967).
We have said many times that the jury may not be
permitted to reach its verdict on the basis of
speculation or conjecture but that there must
be evidence upon which its conclusion may be
based. . . . It means only that the evidence
presented must be such that by reasoning from it,
without resort to prejudice or guess a jury can
reach the conclusion sought by plaintiff, and
not that the conclusions must be the ONLY one " .
which can be logically reached. •...-.•• . It is not
necessary that . . . every fact or circumstance
point unerringly to liability; it is enough that
there be sufficient facts for the jury to say
reasonably that the preponderance favors liability.
(Emphasis theirs)
CCH"Prod Liab Rptr Par 5855 at 7992.

j

The law in Utah is that contributory negligence is not
a defense to liability in a breach of warranty case in the sense
of failing to discover or failing to guard against the defect in
the product.

The Utah Supreme Court, however, has expressly held

that the form of contributory negligence which consists of
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voluntarily and Machine-generated
unreasonably
to encounter a known and

appreciated danger is a defense in a strict liability warranty
action.

Vernon v. Lake Motors,

26 Utah2d 269, 488 P2d 302, 488 P2d 302, 9 UCC Rep 777 (1971).
Hence, if the buyer is fully aware of the dangers of the product
and nonetheless proceeds voluntarily to make use of the product
and suffers loss from its use, he is barred from recovery.
9 UCC Rep at 781.

The Utah Court has accordingly held that this

form of improper conduct against the plaintiff is one which must
be affirmatively proved.

9 UCC Rep. at 781.
POINT I

THE COURT HELD ERRONEOUSLY THAT NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND QUALITY WERE IMPOSED UPON
PLAINTIFF BY ITS SALE OF PROCESSED HOG FEED TO DEFENDANT.
The express and implied warranties created by plaintiff's
sale of processed hog feed to defendant will be considered in four
parts.

Part A will consider the creation of express warranties

by plaintiff-seller.

Part B will focus upon the creation of

implied warranties within the June 25, 1973 sales transaction.
Part C will evaluate the legal effect of buyer requirements and
specifications upon the creation of express and implied warranties.
Part D will examine plaintiff's argument that it cannot be liable
under UCC warranty law if the original host for the salmonella was
the Mr. Meaty Mix feed supplement.
Some preliminary clarification is required at this
point to define properly defendant's warranty argument.

Defendant

urges that the written mixing order prepared by the plaintiff's
Orem feed mill on June 25, 1973 created express and implied
warranties that the hog feed processed by it would conform to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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made nonconforming and unwholesome any hog feed contaminated by

.\

salmonella.
Part A.

UCA §70A-2-313 defines when express warranties

are created in the sale of goods.
The express warranty language of §70A-2-313(l)(b)
provides in relevant part:
Any description of the goods which is made part
of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the
description . . .
Official Comment 1 to UCC §2-313 clarifies when express
warranties by description become part of the

ff

basis of the

bargain11 as follows:
"Express11 warranties rest on "dickered11 aspects
of the individual bargain and go so clearly
to the essence of that bargain that words of
disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the basic
dickered terms. (Quotation marks theirs)
When the seller gives a "description of the goods"
is found in Official Comment 5:
A description need not be by words. Technical
specifications, blueprints and the like can
afford more exact description than mere language
and if made part of the basis of the bargain
goods must conform with them. Past deliveries
may set the description of quality, either
expressly or impliedly by course of dealing . . .
The Utah Supreme Court expressly approved and applied the
language of Official Comment 5 to UCC §2-313 in Pacific Marine
Schwabacher v. Hydroswift, 525 P2d 615, 15 UCC Rep 354 (Utah 1974)
The Hydroswift holding focused upon a small acrylic plastic boat
manufactured and sold by the defendant.

The defendant displayed

acrylic pieces
the
plaintiff-buyer
asSchool,
representative
of the
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construction processes.

The Court cited UCA §70A-2-313 to conclude

that defendant's display of these acrylic pieces created express
warranties by both "description" and "sample".

The Court held

that the defendant breached its express warranties when the
acrylic materials within the delivered boats did not conform to
the molded acrylic pieces. 15 UCC Rep 359.

The Utah Court

similarly found a breach of an express warranty by description
in

Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P2d 602, 15 UCC Rep 1082 (Utah 1974).

This Court held that a written livestock sale agreement identifying
the breed, sex, and age of the cattle to be sold constituted
"a description of the goods" and hence an express warranty within
UCA §70A-2-313(l)(b), 15 UCC Rep at 1083.

The Court found this

express warranty was breached when the livestock delivered were
not those described in the contract of sale.
Pacific Marine Schwabacher, supra., and Lamb, supra.,
follow the command of UCA §70A-2-313(2), that the creation of an
express warranty does not require the seller's specific intent
to make a warranty.
The holdings of the Utah Supreme Court in Pacific
Marine Schwabacher, supra., and Lamb, supra., make clear that
the June 25, 1973 written mixing order prepared by plaintiff's
Orem feed mill was "a description of the goods" when measured by
UCA §70A-2-313(l)(b). The mixing order similarly represented the
"basis of the bargain" between the parties.

Defendant's

June 25, 1973 order for hog feed was made pursuant to a submitted
ration formula as had been all orders by it since 1971. As with
each purchase order transaction between the parties since 1971,
the mixing order
of June 25, 1973 was the feed mill's confirmation
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that the processed hog feed would conform to the mixing order
description.
The conclusion follows that the mixing order prepared
by plaintiff's feed mill on June 23, 1973 created an express
warranty that the hog feed would conform to its blending
description.
Part B.

Defendant urges that warranties of merchant-

ability were implied within the June 25, 1973 hog feed transactior
§70A-2-314(l) provides,
. c . Unless excluded or modified (70A-2-316),
a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable
is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of
that kind.
The record is clear that the June 25, 1973 transaction
was a contract for the sale of processed hog feed.

The written

mixing order contemplated the sale of a hog feed product only.
Similarly, plaintiff imposed one price only for this product whict
price was that for a processed hog feed.

There is likewise no

dispute that the Orem feed mill made plaintiff a "merchant" with
respect to the sale of grains, feed supplements, and processed
livestock feeds.
Reply)

(see, Complaint, Answer and Counterclaim and

Lastly, the only writings which evidenced the June 25, 19'

transaction were plaintiff!s written mixing order and its
subsequent billing statements.

None of these writings contained

any language excluding or modifying the warranties implied in the
sale of the involved hog feed.

The standards of §70A-2-314(l)

compel the conclusion that warranties of merchantability were
implied in the June 25, 1973 hog feed transaction.
The meaning of the "merchantability" obligations impost
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upon plaintiff are defined in §70A-2-314(2):
. . . Goods to be merchantable must be at
least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade
under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are
of fair average quality within the
the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods are used; . . •
The implied warranties of merchantability within
§70A-2-314 arise without regard to party intent and their creation
is not dependent upon particular action or language.
to UCC 2-315.

Comment 1

The function of the implied warranty is to place

the burden of loss on the seller when inferior goods do not conform
to normal commercial standards of safety and effectiveness.
Koellmer v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,
6 Conn Cir Ct 478, 8 UCC Rep 668 (1970).
As with the creation of §70A-2-313 express warranties,
the "contract description" and "description" language of
§70A-2-314(2) was implemented by the terms and specifications
of plaintiff's June 25, 1973 written mixing order.
Part C.
feed formulae

Plaintiff argued at trial that defendant's

constituted buyer requirements and specifications

which excluded the creation of any express and implied warranties.
This argument mistates the law.
Comment 3 to UCC 2-314 defines the legal relationship
between buyer requirements and the warranty of merchantability
implied in a contract for the sale of goods.

This Comment states,

A specific designation of goods by the
buyer does not exclude the seller's obligation
that they be fit for the general purposes
appropriate to such goods. . . .
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Comment 9 to UCC §2-316 further defines the relationship
between buyer requirements and the attachment of express and
implied warranties to a contract for the sale of goods:
The situation in which the buyer gives
precise and complete specifications to the seller
is . . . a frequent circumstance by which the
implied warranties may be excluded. . . . The
(implied) warranty of merchantability in such a
transaction . . . must be considered in
connection with the next section (e.g., UCC 2-317)
on the cumulation and conflict of warranties.
Under paragraph (c) of that section in case of
such an inconsistency the implied warranty of
merchantability is displaced by the express
warranty that the goods will comply with the
specifications. Thus, where the buyer gives
detailed specifications as to the goods, neither
of the implied warranties as to quality will
normally apply to the transactions unless
consistent with the specifications. (Deletions
and emphasis mine)
The quoted Comments make clear that a buyerTs precise
and complete specifications to the seller do not exclude an expres
warranty by the seller that the goods will conform to the
specifications where such specifications are made part of .the basi
of the bargain between the parties.

The result follows that who

provides the specifications and why is not a material inquiry wit!
a §70A-2-313 express warranty action.

Part A of this Argument has

established that plaintiff's written mixing order was a
"description of the goods11 which was "made a part of the basis of
the bargain" between the parties.

An express warranty was

accordingly created.
The quoted Comments likewise establish that warranties
of merchantability are implied in buyer requirement sales
transactions consistent with those specifications made part of t\
basis of the bargain.

UCA §70A-2-317 confirms this result by
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Tjflrr^nties cumulative and by

subordinating inconsistent implied warranties to the terms of the
express warranty.

The implied warranty of merchantability

provisions of UCA §70A~2-314(2)(a),(b),^(c) have been demonstrated
to apply to this action.

Their application is both cumulative

to and consistent with the express warranty by description created
from the specifications of plaintiff's mixing order.
Case law confirms that implied warranties of
merchantability are created in those situations where the buyer
has given precise and complete specifications to the seller.
In Kasab v. Central Soya,
432 Pa 217 246 A2d 848, 5 UCC Rep 925 (1968), plaintiffs:
were engaged in the business of breeding purebred cattle.

The

plaintiffs placed an order for cattle feed with the defendant
feed mill, Pritts.

The purchase order contained a ration

formula previously blended by the defendant.

The court concluded

without extensive analysis that the specifications of the
plaintiff-buyer did not displace or modify the implied warranties
of merchantability.

The court found that the livestock feed was

contaminated and that the implied warranties had been breached for
the reason that the feed as mixed did not conform to the mixture
ordered.
In Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp.,
294 F Supp 649, 5 UCC Rep 1219 (Pa 1968), the plaintiff had
entered into a contract of sale for a sophisticated oil compound
to be utilized within its manufacturing program.

The product \>zas

developed by the defendant to meet the requirements and
specifications designated by plaintiff.

A delivery of this oil

product to plaintiff was found by the court to be nonconforming.
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The court held that the specifications and requirements submitted
by the plaintiff, when accepted by the defendant, created an

,

express warranty that the oil product would accordingly conform.
The court found that this express warranty created by the
defendant was breached.

The court further found that implied

warranties of merchantability were created consistent with the
creation of the express warranties.

In holding that the implied

warranties of merchantability had been breached the court rejected
the defendant's arguments that the specifications submitted by
the plaintiff excluded the imposition of implied warranties of
merchantability to the sales transaction.
The case of Falcon Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Systems, Inc.
v. Worthington Corp., 300 A2d 231, 11 UCC Rep 963 (Del Super 1972)
involved sales transactions in which the defendants contracted to
build and design a boat in accordance with specifications and
plans submitted by the plaintiff buyer.

The court rejected the

defendant's argument that no express warranties and implied
warranties of merchantability could attach to the sale.

In

holding that express warranties by description and consistent
implied warranties of merchantability were created in the sales
transaction, the Court expressly acknowledged that the
specifications and plans submitted by the plaintiff-buyer did not
per se exclude warranty merchantability.
In Brickman-Joy Corp. v. National Annealing Box Co.,
459 F2d 133, 10 UCC Rep 539 (2d Cir 1972), the court found
implied warranties of merchantability to have been created and
breached as a matter of law when a large galvanizing kettle
crackedDigitized
and bycollapsed.
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kettle
had been manufact
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by the defendant in accordance with inside dimensions specified
by the plaintiff buyer.
The result follows that the feed formulas submitted by
the defendant to plaintiff's Orem feed mill did not exclude an
express warranty that the processed hog feed would confrom to
the specifications of the June 25, 1973 mixing order.

Consistent

with this express warranty, a cumulative implied warranty of
merchantability attached to the June 25, 1973 sales transaction.
Part D.

One of plaintiff's defenses at trial was that

the salmonella present in the involved bulk load of hog feed
originated in the feed supplement, Mr. Meaty Mix.

Mr. Meaty Mix

was the only ingredient in the hog feed that was not sold and
supplied by plaintiff.

Plaintiff urged that the warranty provisions

of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code applied only to contracts for
the sale of goods and that consequently it could incur no UCC
warranty liability if the believable weight of evidence placed the
origin of the salmonella in the Mr. Meaty Mix.

Defendant submits

that plaintiff's argument misapplies the law because it denies
that the June 25, 1973 transaction was nothing more nor less than
one contract for the sale of bulk load processed hog feed.
Defendant argues that the strict liability warranty action
requires only that it show by the believable weight of the
evidence that the involved load of hog feed was contaminated
with salmonella at the time the load left plaintiff's control for
delivery to defendant.

Conversely, defendant has no burden upon

it to show which ingredient within the hog feed was the
original host for the salmonella, to include the Mr. Meaty Mix
supplement.

Acceptance of plaintiff's argument would require this
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court to sever the June 25, 1973 transaction into three distinct
transactions —

plaintiff's sale of ingredients to plaintiff,

-

defendant's supply of Mr. Meaty Mix to plaintiff, and plaintiff's
processing for defendant of all the ingredients into a bulk load
of pellet hog feed.

Plaintiff's attempt to avoid

warranty

liability by breaking the subject commercial transaction into its
sale and service elements is contrary to the law.

The courts have

uniformly refused to isolate and itemize the elements of a
commercial transaction

In each instance, the courts have looked

to the predominant feature of the commercial transaction in order
to establish its legal identity.

The courts determine the

predominant feature of the transaction by looking to the intent
of the parties and the circumstances in which they are dealing.
Epstein v. Giammattasio, 197 A2d 342, 1 UCC Rep 114 (Conn C P 196
(defective hairdressing supplies part of beauty salon treatment
held subject of contract was one for rendition of services and no
one for sale of goods.)

Cassina v. Morris M. Taylor & Sons, Inc.

2 UCC Rep 1148 (Conn Cir 1964)(beauty salon treatment essentially
a transaction for services — materials used in performance of
such services incidental to predominant purpose of transaction.)
The insistence of the courts to look only to the transaction as
a whole and to identify it by its predominating feature is furth*
evidenced in actions focusing upon building construction contraci
In Busch v. Aluminum Metal Products,
8 UCC Rep 335 (NY Sup Ct 1970)., the court rejected plaintiff's
argument that a kitchen remodeling contract was essentially one
sale of the appliances, floor covering, cabinets and formica
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transaction and found the contract to be one for services.
The Pennsylvania courts have similarly found that a
contract to construct a home is not a contract for the sale of
bricks, roofing, etc., used in construction.

DeMatteo v. White,

16 UCC Rep 926 (Pa Super Ct 1975).
The most articulated body of case law representing the
court's insistence to identify a transaction by its essential
and primary objective is found in the blood transfusion cases.
see, Dibblee v. D. H. Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital,
12 Utah2d 241, 364 P2d 1085 (1961).

The results of these cases

are split as to whether the supplying of blood for value incident
to the medical treatment and hospitalization of the patient is
a contract for the sale of goods or one for the rendition of
services.

The prevailing rationale of all of these cases is to

the main object and purpose of the transaction incident to
characterizing as one predicated upon service or sale. see,
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital,
308 NY 100, 123 NE2d 792 (1954)(blood transfusion incident to
rendition of services)., Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital,
47 I112d 443, 266 NE2d 897 (19

)(blood transfusion a sale).

The case law cited above supports defendant's argument
that the June 25, 1973 hog feed transaction was one for the sale
of processed hog feed only.

The case law confirms defendant's

argument that no obligation is imposed upon it by the strict
warranty liability action to isolate which ingredient within the
hog feed was the original host for the salmonella.

This latter

rule of law applies to the Mr. Meaty Mix supplement as well as to
any other ingredient blended by plaintiff into the hog feed.
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Vernon v. Lake Motors,
26 Utah2d 269, 488 P2d 302, 9 UCC Rep 777 (1971)(proof of specific
defect not required in UCC warranty action).
In conclusion, the court erred in granting plaintiff's
motion for a directed verdict for the reasons that the Utah
Supreme Court has held that the existence of warranty is an issue
of fact for jury determination.

Pacific Marine Schwabacher, Inc.

v. Hydroswift, 525 P2d 615, 15 UCC Rep 354 (Utah 1974).

Plaintiff

case in chief provided ample factual confirmation that an express
warranty of description and consistent implied warranties of
merchantability attached to the June 25, 1973 hog feed
transaction.
POINT II
THE COURT HELD ERRONEOUSLY THAT PLAINTIFF BREACHED
NO EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND QUALITY
BY ITS SALE OF CONTAMINATED PROCESSED HOG FEED TO DEFENDANT.
Defendant contends that the presence of salmonella
in the hog feed delivery of June 27, 19.73 constituted a breach
of plaintiff's express and implied warranties.
evidence at trial was,

(A)

Defendant's

that salmonella had contaminated

the subject hog feed prior to plaintifffs delivery of the feed
to defendant's farm,

(B)

that the salmonella was introduced int

the feed because of fecal contamination in the feed, and

(C)

th

the hog's consumption of this feed caused the scours epidemic in
the hogs.
The evidence set forth below is that developed by
defendant at trial to establish that plaintiff breached its
express and implied warranties.
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"npfp.ndant's farm is a modern operation which medically

borders on a pathogen free operation.

This qualitative conclusion

was made by Dr. Hunter and was supported by the testimony of
Dr. Claire Accord, livestock specialist* Utah State University
Extension Service.

Prior to the June 25, 1973 transaction,

defendant's experience with scours in its hogs had been
minimal and in all instances had been confined to the suckling
pigs

(Tr. at 120 - 121; 153 - 154). The scours in these

suckling hogs had in all instances been caused by nutritional
changes in the milk of the sows

(Tr. at 86 - 87). None of the

defendant's hogs prior to June 25, 1973 had ever incurred scours
resulting from the salmonella pathogen

(Tr. at 153 - 154).

Moreover, the number of suckling hogs affected at any given time
with nutritional scours had always been less than 1% of defendant's
hogs

(Tr. at 86 - 87; 154). Defendant's experience with scours

in its hogs following September, 1973 to the time of trial was
identical to the events and circumstances prior to June, 1973
(Tr. 87, 172).
The events material to this action occurred from
June 25, 1973 to the end of September, 1973.

During this* .

approximate three month interval, 20% of defendant's hogs became
afflicted with scours

(Tr. at 87).

Unlike any time prior or

since, the age group of the hogs affected were the weaner and
feeder pigs —

20 pounds to 60 pounds

(Tr. at 87).

Unlike any

time prior or since, defendant sustained death losses from scours
in this size group and the death losses were substantial
(Tr. at 58, 87, 153 - 154). Unlike any time prior or since,
this scour epidemic was caused by the salmonella pathogen
(Tr. at 153 - 154).
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Dr. Jon F. Hunter testified at trial that it was his
expert medical* opinion that the June through September scours
epidemic in defendant's hogs was caused-by the salmonella
pathogen

(Tr. at 162).

Dr. Hunter's conclusion was derived

preliminarily from the tests results of the U. S. Department of
Agriculture Research Laboratory showing salmonella present in all
fecal samples submitted to it by Dr. Hunter

(Tr. at 161).

Dr.

Hunterfs medical opinion was also that the salmonella pathogen
originated in the bulk load of pellet hog feed delivered to
defendant on June 27, 1973 and that the salmonella was already
present in the feed upon delivery

(Tr. at 168, 194). The hogs

consequently contracted the salmonella and resulting scours
epidemic after being fed from this bulk load of feed on either
June 27 or 28, 1973

(Tr. at 23).

Dr. Hunter's opinion that the

subject load of hog feed was the source of the salmonella causing
the scours epidemic was derived in part from the feed sample test
results received by Dr. Hunter from Intermountain Laboratories
(Tr. at 165 - 168). The feed sample test results confirmed
salmonella present in one of the three feed samples submitted.
(Tr. at 136 - 137; 163 - 165). Similarly, the fecal sample resul'
confirmed salmonella present in six of the seven submitted sample
(Tr. at 134, 166). Dr. Hunter confirmed that all samples were
taken pursuant to good medical procedure thereby eliminating
cross-contamination between samples

(Tr. at 166). Dr. Paul

Derrick testified that he was the chief microbiologist at
Intermountain Laboratories and was responsible for the accuracy
of the feed sample and fecal sample test results described above
(Tr. atDigitized
132 by-the133,
137; defendant's exhibits 63 - 72).
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Dr. Derrick reported the presence of the pathogen enterococci
group D strep in two of the three submitted feed samples
(Tr. at 136 - 137). The medical significance of the presence of
this pathogen in two of the three feed samples was confirmed
uniformly by Dr. Hunter and Dr. Derrick.

Both men identified

enterococci group D strip as an organism growing in the tract of
man and animals

(Tr. at 136 - 137). Both men confirmed that the

presence of this organism in the hog feed demonstrated that the
hog feed had been contaminated with fecal material
168).

(Tr. at 136,

The connection between fecal material in the hog feed with

the salmonella pathogen was defined by both Dr. Derrick and
Dr. Hunter.

Their medical conclusion was that salmonella can

exist in cereal based feed products only if the involved grain
ingredients are first fecally contaminated

(Tr. at 144, 147, 182)

The presence of the enterococci group D strep organism in the
feed samples was relied upon by Dr. Hunter to medically conclude
that the salmonella contamination in the involved bulk load of
pellet hog feed was the result of foreign fecal material in the
feed

(Tr. at 168, 193), Dr. Hunter's conclusion was likewise

that this fecal material was present in the hog feed prior to its •
delivery to defendant

(Tr. at 194).

Dr. Hunter's conclusion of fecal material in the hog
feed as the host for the salmonella pathogen and that this
condition was present prior to delivery was based upon evaluation
criteria going beyond laboratory test results.

Dr. Hunter's

opinion was in part based upon his personal examination of
defendant's farm and hogs on July 6, 1973.

Dr. Hunter, as had

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Paul Haderlie, examined on this day the subject hog feed and
visually noted its off-color appearance

(Tr. at 38 - 39,

155 - 156). At the same time, Dr. Hunter confirmed from Paul
Haderlie that the feed emitted a bad odor and individually
confirmed that the hogs were
feeder and onto the floor

l!

rootingl! this feed out of the

(Tr. at 39, 155 - 156). Dr. Hunter

then eliminated, with reasonable medical certainty, the hogs1
water supply, air contamination, and recently purchased hogs as
contamination sources

(Tr. at 168).

As of July 6, 1973

'.,

Dr. Hunter had preliminarily isolated the involved bulk load of
hog feed as the source of the scours epidemic and had done so
independently of laboratory testing

(Tr. at 174 - 178).

Dr. Hunter's conclusions that the hog feed was
contaminated with salmonella prior to delivery as the result of
fecal material in the grain is corroborated by the expert opinion
testimony of Paul Haderlie.

Haderlie testified, without

contradiction, to his former employment in the livestock feed
processing business at plaintiff's Orem feed mill

(Tr. at 37).

Haderliefs expertise to evaluate livestock feed for
composition and quality were accepted by the court without
objection by plaintiff

(Tr. at 37). s^e, 49 ALR2d 932

Admissability of Opinion Evidence of Lay Witnesses as to Diseases
and Physical Condition of Animals (1956) . Haderlie testified the
the color and smell of the involved hog feed established that
foreign material "screenings'1 had been blended into the hog feed
by plaintiff's Orem feed mill

(Tr. at 40, 43). Haderlie define

screenings as all residue and matter extracted from the grain in
the feed
mill's cleaning processes (Tr. at 43).
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Plaintiff's argument that the salmonella contamination
in the hog feed could have originated only in the meat base
product, Mr. Meaty Mix, is not supported by the evidence.
Defendant agrees with plaintiff that salmonella is found
generally in meats and meat base products rather than in grains
and cereal compounds

(Tr. at 144, 182). This general rule,

however, both ignores and is displaced by the particular facts
of this case.

Replacement feed was ordered by defendant from

Leland Milling Company on July 3, 1973 and July 7, 1973

(Tr. at

45, 64). The Mr. Meaty Mix blended into this hog feed was from
the same manufacturer's lot number as that which had been used by
plaintiff in processing the June 25, 1973 hog feed order
(Tr. at 201). Moreover, the hog feed processed by Leland Milling
Company was readily accepted and consumed by defendent's hogs
(Tr. at 203).

Plaintiff's argument further ignores the rule of

law that defendant's burden of proof does not require it to
eliminate every possible cause.

(see, cases cited infra.).

It is also not persuasive that the hog farm to which
plaintiff sold the involved bulk load of hog feed experienced no
scours outbreak in its hogs.

Dr. Hunter testified that defendant's

farm bordered on a pathogen free operation with the result that
defendant's hog had probable low immunities.

The environment of

defendant's farm therefore distinguished it from other hog farms
in Utah County which did not maintain such medical controls.
Consequently, such farms would have hogs with higher immunity levels
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and likely did not possess the controls to identify the pathogen
as did defendant

(Tr. at 192).

In conclusion, the motion for ..directed verdict granted
to plaintiff was error as a matter of law.

Both the existence of

a warranty and its breach constitute issues of fact for jury
determination.

Pacific Marine Schwabacher, Inc., supra., and

cases cited infra.

Issues of fact for jury determination were

properly created by the evidence from plaintiff's case in chief.
POINT III
THE COURT HELD ERRONEOUSLY THAT DEFENDANT INCURRED NO
PROPERTY LOSS AND DAMAGE AS A RESULT OF PLAINTIFF'S SALE TO IT
OF CONTAMINATED PROCESSED HOG FEED.
No determination was ever extended by the trial court
to the damages issue.

The trial court's attention, as was that

of plaintiff's motion for directed verdict, was directed solely
toward the liability elements of defendant's warranty action.
As a matter of law and within the rules of a motion for directed
verdict, defendant's evidence in chief was sufficient to establisl
an action for nominal damages.
Supply Co. Inc.,

Jorritsma v. Farmer's Feed &

538 P2d 61, 17 UCC Rep 696 (Ore 1975).

Defendant established the following kinds of
property damage and loss amounts:
(1) Loss of weight gain for 175 marketable hogs from
July 7, 1973 to August 15, 1973; $2,205
(Tr. at 49 - 58)
(2)

42 hog deaths within feeder and weaner hog sizes
from July to August, 1973; $1,260

(3)

28 suckling pig deaths resulting from sows with
litters being evacuated from hog house to outside
by direction of Dr. Hunter in September, 1973;
$580
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(4)

Veterinarian billings for treatment of scours
epidemic; $281

(5)

Laboratory testing fees; $105

(6)

Pharmaceutical; $287.58

(7) Employment of high school boys to assist
defendant in housekeeping operations during
scours epidemic; $848
All damages designated above are consistent with a
warranty action under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code.
UCA §70A-2-714., UCA §70A-2-715.

It is to be noted that the

basic breach of warranty damages formula within §70A-2-714(2)
is not applicable to this action and must defer to §70A-2~715.
In conclusion, defendant established elements of damages
creating issues of fact for jury determination.

The court's

directed verdict against defendant was therefore error as to
damages.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff's motion for directed verdict granted
by the court constituted error.

The existence of a warranty,

its breach, and resulting damages constitutes issues for the
trier of fact under Utah case law and the majority rule.
issues of fact were property created from the evidence of
defendant's case in chief upon its Counterclaim.

C. C. Patterson
and
Philip C. Patterson
427 - 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
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